Community incidence patterns drive the risk of SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks and alter intervention impacts in a high-risk institutional setting.

Optimization of control measures for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) in high-risk institutional settings (e.g., prisons, nursing homes, or military bases) depends on how transmission dynamics in the broader community influence outbreak risk locally. We calibrated an individual-based transmission model of a military training camp to the number of RT-PCR positive trainees throughout 2020 and 2021. The predicted number of infected new arrivals closely followed adjusted national incidence and increased early outbreak risk after accounting for vaccination coverage, masking compliance, and virus variants. Outbreak size was strongly correlated with the predicted number of off-base infections among staff during training camp. In addition, off-base infections reduced the impact of arrival screening and masking, while the number of infectious trainees upon arrival reduced the impact of vaccination and staff testing. Our results highlight the importance of outside incidence patterns for modulating risk and the optimal mixture of control measures in institutional settings.

Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 among recruits in a US Army training environment: a brief report.

BACKGROUND: In 2020, preventive measures were implemented to mitigate the spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) among 600-700 recruits arriving weekly at a basic combat training (BCT) facility in the southern United States. Trainees were sorted into companies and platoons (cocoons) at arrival, tested, quarantined for 14 days with daily temperature and respiratory-symptom monitoring and retested before release into larger groups for training where symptomatic testing was conducted. Nonpharmaceutical measures, such as masking, and social distancing, were maintained throughout quarantine and BCT. We assessed for SARS-CoV-2 transmission in the quarantine milieu. METHODS: Nasopharyngeal (NP) swabs were collected at arrival and at the end of quarantine and blood specimens at both timepoints and at the end of BCT. Epidemiological characteristics were analyzed for transmission clusters identified from whole-genome sequencing of NP samples. RESULTS: Among 1403 trainees enrolled from 25 August to 7 October 2020, epidemiological analysis identified three transmission clusters (n = 20 SARS-CoV-2 genomes) during quarantine, which spanned five different cocoons. However, SARS-CoV-2 incidence decreased from 2.7% during quarantine to 1.5% at the end of BCT; prevalence at arrival was 3.3%. CONCLUSIONS: These findings suggest layered SARS-CoV-2 mitigation measures implemented during quarantine minimized the risk of further transmission in BCT.

Cross-Cutting Lessons Learned During the COVID-19 Pandemic-the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research Experience.

INTRODUCTION: At the start of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR) mobilized to rapidly conduct medical research to detect, prevent, and treat the disease in order to minimize the impact of the pandemic on the health and readiness of U.S. Forces. WRAIR's major efforts included the development of the Department of Defense (DoD) COVID-19 vaccine candidate, researching novel drug therapies and monoclonal antibodies, refining and scaling-up diagnostic capabilities, evaluating the impact of viral diversity, assessing the behavioral health of Soldiers, supporting U.S. DoD operational forces overseas, and providing myriad assistance to allied nations. WRAIR personnel have also filled key roles within the whole of government response to the pandemic. WRAIR had to overcome major pandemic-related operational challenges in order to quickly execute a multimillion-dollar portfolio of COVID-19 research. Consequently, the organization learned lessons that could benefit other leaders of medical research organizations preparing for the next pandemic. MATERIALS AND METHODS: We identified lessons learned using a qualitative thematic analysis of 76 observation/recommendation pairs from across the organization. These lessons learned were organized under the Army's four pillars of readiness (staffing, training, equipping, and leadership development). To this framework, we added organizing and leading to best capture our experiences within the context of pandemic response. RESULTS: The major lessons learned for organizing were: (1) the pandemic created a need to rapidly pivot to new scientific priorities; (2) necessary health and safety precautions disrupted the flow of normal science and put programs at risk of missing milestones; (3) relationships with partners and allies facilitated medical diplomacy and advancement of U.S. national military and economic goals; and (4) a successful response required interoperability within and across multiple organizations. For equipping: (1) existing infrastructure lacked sufficient capacity and technical capability to allow immediate countermeasure development; (2) critical supply chains were strained; and (3) critical information system function and capacity were suddenly insufficient under maximum remote work. For staffing and training: (1) successful telework required rapid shifts in management, engagement, and accountability methods; and (2) organizational policies and processes had to adapt quickly to support remote staffing. For leading and leadership development (1) engaged, hopeful, and empathetic leadership made a difference; and (2) the workforce benefitted from concerted leadership communication that created a shared understanding of shifting priorities as well as new processes and procedures. CONCLUSIONS: An effective pandemic response requires comprehensive institutional preparedness that facilitates flexibility and surge capacity. The single most important action leaders of medical research organizations can take to prepare for the next pandemic is to develop a quick-reaction force that would activate under prespecified criteria to manage reprioritization of all science and support activities to address pandemic response priorities at the velocity of relevance.

Virological and Serological Assessment of US Army Trainees Isolated for Coronavirus Disease 2019.

BACKGROUND: Laboratory screening for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is a key mitigation measure to avoid the spread of infection among recruits starting basic combat training in a congregate setting. Because viral nucleic acid can be detected persistently after recovery, we evaluated other laboratory markers to distinguish recruits who could proceed with training from those who were infected. METHODS: Recruits isolated for coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) were serially tested for SARS-CoV-2 subgenomic ribonucleic acid (sgRNA), and viral load (VL) by reverse-transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR), and for anti- SARS-CoV-2. Cluster and quadratic discriminant analyses of results were performed. RESULTS: Among 229 recruits isolated for COVID-19, those with a RT-PCR cycle threshold >30.49 (sensitivity 95%, specificity 96%) or having sgRNA log10 RNA copies/mL <3.09 (sensitivity and specificity 96%) at entry into isolation were likely SARS-CoV-2 uninfected. Viral load >4.58 log10 RNA copies/mL or anti-SARS-CoV-2 signal-to-cutoff ratio <1.38 (VL: sensitivity and specificity 93%; anti-SARS-CoV-2: sensitivity 83%, specificity 79%) had comparatively lower sensitivity and specificity when used alone for discrimination of infected from uninfected. CONCLUSIONS: Orthogonal laboratory assays used in combination with RT-PCR may have utility in determining SARS-CoV-2 infection status for decisions regarding isolation.

Validation of SARS-CoV-2 pooled testing for surveillance using the Panther Fusion® system: Impact of pool size, automation, and assay chemistry.

Combining diagnostic specimens into pools has been considered as a strategy to augment throughput, decrease turnaround time, and leverage resources. This study utilized a multi-parametric approach to assess optimum pool size, impact of automation, and effect of nucleic acid amplification chemistries on the detection of SARS-CoV-2 RNA in pooled samples for surveillance testing on the Hologic Panther Fusion® System. Dorfman pooled testing was conducted with previously tested SARS-CoV-2 nasopharyngeal samples using Hologic's Aptima® and Panther Fusion® SARS-CoV-2 Emergency Use Authorization assays. A manual workflow was used to generate pool sizes of 5:1 (five samples: one positive, four negative) and 10:1. An automated workflow was used to generate pool sizes of 3:1, 4:1, 5:1, 8:1 and 10:1. The impact of pool size, pooling method, and assay chemistry on sensitivity, specificity, and lower limit of detection (LLOD) was evaluated. Both the Hologic Aptima® and Panther Fusion® SARS-CoV-2 assays demonstrated >85% positive percent agreement between neat testing and pool sizes ≤5:1, satisfying FDA recommendation. Discordant results between neat and pooled testing were more frequent for positive samples with CT>35. Fusion® CT (cycle threshold) values for pooled samples increased as expected for pool sizes of 5:1 (CT increase of 1.92-2.41) and 10:1 (CT increase of 3.03-3.29). The Fusion® assay demonstrated lower LLOD than the Aptima® assay for pooled testing (956 vs 1503 cp/mL, pool size of 5:1). Lowering the cut-off threshold of the Aptima® assay from 560 kRLU (manufacturer's setting) to 350 kRLU improved the assay sensitivity to that of the Fusion® assay for pooled testing. Both Hologic's SARS-CoV-2 assays met the FDA recommended guidelines for percent positive agreement (>85%) for pool sizes ≤5:1. Automated pooling increased test throughput and enabled automated sample tracking while requiring less labor. The Fusion® SARS-CoV-2 assay, which demonstrated a lower LLOD, may be more appropriate for surveillance testing.

Prioritizing interventions for preventing COVID-19 outbreaks in military basic training.

Like other congregate living settings, military basic training has been subject to outbreaks of COVID-19. We sought to identify improved strategies for preventing outbreaks in this setting using an agent-based model of a hypothetical cohort of trainees on a U.S. Army post. Our analysis revealed unique aspects of basic training that require customized approaches to outbreak prevention, which draws attention to the possibility that customized approaches may be necessary in other settings, too. In particular, we showed that introductions by trainers and support staff may be a major vulnerability, given that those individuals remain at risk of community exposure throughout the training period. We also found that increased testing of trainees upon arrival could actually increase the risk of outbreaks, given the potential for false-positive test results to lead to susceptible individuals becoming infected in group isolation and seeding outbreaks in training units upon release. Until an effective transmission-blocking vaccine is adopted at high coverage by individuals involved with basic training, need will persist for non-pharmaceutical interventions to prevent outbreaks in military basic training. Ongoing uncertainties about virus variants and breakthrough infections necessitate continued vigilance in this setting, even as vaccination coverage increases.

Evaluation of Antibody-Dependent Fc-Mediated Viral Entry, as Compared With Neutralization, in SARS-CoV-2 Infection.

Fc-mediated virus entry has been observed for many viruses, but the characterization of this activity in convalescent plasma against SARS-CoV-2 Variants of Concern (VOC) is undefined. In this study, we evaluated Fc-mediated viral entry (FVE) on FcγRIIa-expressing HEK293 cells in the presence of SARS-CoV-2 convalescent plasma and compared it with SARS-CoV-2 pseudovirus neutralization using ACE2-expressing HEK293 cells. The plasma were collected early in the pandemic from 39 individuals. We observed both neutralization and FVE against the infecting Washington SARS-CoV-2 strain for 31% of plasmas, neutralization, but not FVE for 61% of plasmas, and no neutralization or FVE for 8% of plasmas. Neutralization titer correlated significantly with the plasma dilution at which maximum FVE was observed, indicating Fc-mediated uptake peaked as neutralization potency waned. While total Spike-specific plasma IgG levels were similar between plasma that mediated FVE and those that did not, Spike-specific plasma IgM levels were significantly higher in plasma that did not mediate FVE. Plasma neutralization titers against the Alpha (B.1.1.7), Beta (B.1.351), Gamma (P.1) and Delta (B.1.617.2) VOC were significantly lower than titers against the Washington strain, while plasma FVE activity against the VOC was either higher or similar. This is the first report to demonstrate a functional shift in convalescent plasma antibodies from neutralizing and FVE-mediating against the earlier Washington strain, to an activity mediating only FVE and no neutralization activity against the emerging VOC, specifically the Beta (B.1.351) and Gamma (P.1) VOC. It will be important to determine the in vivo relevance of these findings.

A SARS-CoV-2 Spike Ferritin Nanoparticle Vaccine Is Protective and Promotes a Strong Immunological Response in the Cynomolgus Macaque Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Model.

The COVID-19 pandemic has had a staggering impact on social, economic, and public health systems worldwide. Vaccine development and mobilization against SARS-CoV-2 (the etiologic agent of COVID-19) has been rapid. However, novel strategies are still necessary to slow the pandemic, and this includes new approaches to vaccine development and/or delivery that will improve vaccination compliance and demonstrate efficacy against emerging variants. Here, we report on the immunogenicity and efficacy of a SARS-CoV-2 vaccine comprising stabilized, pre-fusion spike protein trimers displayed on a ferritin nanoparticle (SpFN) adjuvanted with either conventional aluminum hydroxide or the Army Liposomal Formulation QS-21 (ALFQ) in a cynomolgus macaque COVID-19 model. Vaccination resulted in robust cell-mediated and humoral responses and a significant reduction in lung lesions following SARS-CoV-2 infection. The strength of the immune response suggests that dose sparing through reduced or single dosing in primates may be possible with this vaccine. Overall, the data support further evaluation of SpFN as a SARS-CoV-2 protein-based vaccine candidate with attention to fractional dosing and schedule optimization.

Serological and RT-PCR Surveillance for COVID-19 in an Asymptomatic US Army Trainee Population.

BACKGROUND: Significant variability exists in the application of infection control policy throughout the US Army initial entry training environment. To generate actionable information for the prevention of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2)/coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) transmission among new recruits, active enhanced surveillance was conducted for evidence of and exposure to SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19. METHODS: We serially tested recruits with a reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) COVID-19 and/or total antibody to SARS-CoV-2 tests at days 0, 14, and week 10 upon arrival for basic combat training at a location in the Southern United States. RESULTS: Among 1403 recruits who were enrolled over a 6-week period from August 25 through October 11, 2020, 84 recruits tested positive by RT-PCR, with more than half (55%, 46/84) testing positive at arrival and almost two-thirds (63%, 53/84) also testing seropositive at arrival. Similarly, among an overall 146 recruits who tested seropositive for SARS-CoV-2 during the period of observation, a majority (86%) tested seropositive at arrival; no hospitalizations were observed among seropositive recruits, and antibody response increased at week 10. CONCLUSIONS: These findings that suggest serological testing may complement current test-based measures and provide another tool to incorporate in COVID-19 mitigation measures among trainees in the US Army.